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ABSTRACT
 
A few of years have passed since the so-called dot-com crash and researchers
are now conducting post-mortem reviews of the valuation debacle. At the
time, there was widespread agreement within the analyst community that the
value of a Website was inherently related to the number of potential custom-
ers who came to the site for information and eventually purchased a product
or executed a service. As a follow-up to this mode of thinking, we consider
the relationship between stock prices and Web metrics in addition to tradi-
tional accounting information for a sample of 15 top Internet companies.
Speciﬁcally, we develop various regression models with the following four
variables: unique visitors, revenues, gross margin, and sales and marketing
expenses. Our results support the hypothesis that Web metrics did as equally
good a job at explaining Internet stock prices as traditional accounting mea-
sures did. It seems that as stock price valuations for these companies
increased, analysts required new metrics to justify their astronomical valua-
tions and veered away from generally accepted accounting principles.
 
CHAPTER 1
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If I were a Business School Professor in Finance, I would assign the following exam: 
“How do you value Internet companies?” and I would fail any student that
did not leave the answer sheet blank.
 
—Warren Buffet, Chairman and CEO of Berkshire Hathaway
 
INTRODUCTION
 
The knowledge era is upon us and the Internet is the catalyst that is accel-
erating the growing importance of information. In the new economy,
knowledge management discriminates between the sustainable and unsus-
tainable advantage of ﬁrms (Bontis, 1999, 2001). The efﬁcient use of
acquired knowledge is the ultimate core competency required for compet-
itiveness and prosperity. The ever-increasing popularity of ﬁelds such as
organizational learning (Crossan, Lane, & White, 1999; Bontis, Crossan, &
Hulland, 2002), knowledge management (Nonaka & Takeuchi, 1995; Bon-
tis, Dragonetti, Jacobsen, & Roos, 1999; Stovel & Bontis, 2002) and intellec-
tual capital (Bontis, 1996, 1998, 2002; Stewart, 1997; Sveiby, 1997) clearly
supports this trend and demonstrates the belief that the dissemination and
use of information is of critical importance. The advent of the Internet has
brought people together to share ideas, knowledge, products, and services.
However, the driving business force behind the Internet will ultimately be
proﬁt as companies take advantage of the Web as an advertising medium
and as a unique business channel. No longer will the creation of a simple
Web presence be sufﬁcient cause for heavy investment in an Internet strat-
egy. The development of entirely new Web-based businesses spawned the
phenomenon of the “net stock” also referred to as the “dot-com.” Leading
up to the crash of 2000, these companies struggled in search of proﬁtabil-
ity. Analysts struggled to justify the enormous market capitalizations that
accompanied them. 
For the purposes of this paper, Internet stocks will be narrowly deﬁned
as those Web-based companies or dot-com organizations that typically
interfaced directly with consumers. In general, prior to the technology
crash of 2000, Internet stocks were not subject to the requirement of cur-
rent proﬁtability. Investors were content to wait for the future on the
chance they would own a piece of the new economy. In the short term,
however, we were left with the challenge of putting a price on that chance.
Davis, Halper, Grebb, and Schibsted (1999) identiﬁes 20 traditional indus-
tries that would become dinosaurs in the Internet revolution unless they
changed the fundamental premise of their businesses. They cited such
industries as insurance, newspapers, travel agents and car dealers. They
argued that these industries would embrace new e-commerce ideals and
displace traditional business models in order to survive the Web revolution.
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Since the new model would likely be realized by only a few companies,
investors staked their claims early because the market was moving too
quickly to wait for a clearer direction to unfold. Wooley (1999) highlights
how valuations were very difﬁcult:
 
To get a chuckle (or a groan) out of an analyst, ask for the best way to value
Internet stocks. Because so few of these companies make money, the tradi-
tional method of weighing the stock’s share price against the company’s
earnings—the good old price to earnings ratio—doesn’t work.
 
Internet stocks were different from their traditional counterparts. The
untapped potential of the Web made them different. Fox and Hodges
(1999) warn that Web-based companies were not following the traditional
rules of the game. The market winners ignored ﬁnancial performance and
focused on moving quickly, spending any amount of money necessary to
build a vision and claiming as much Internet market share as possible.
That market share was not measured in revenue; in many cases there was
no revenue. Internet market share was measured by people. The more peo-
ple that visited a site and the longer they stayed made a site more attractive
to advertisers and investors and created greater untapped potential as
those people were slowly converted to customers.
Although the remarkable growth of e-commerce had been embraced by
many businesses, analysts were still skeptical at our ability in measuring the
success of such Web-based ventures. As a measure of performance the use
of Website metrics such as “number of page hits” became very popular.
Website counters were widely used but offered little insight into the value
created by investing in a Web presence. The search for better Web metrics
was most important to companies that were betting their entire business on
Internet advertising and sales. 
E-businesses such as Yahoo, Amazon.com, eBay, and E*trade depended
solely on business conducted over the Web and/or advertising revenue.
The ability to report meaningful Web metrics to customers, advertisers,
Web users, and investors was crucial. The value of a Website was inherently
related to the number of potential customers who visited the site for infor-
mation and eventually purchased a product or executed a service. How-
ever, ﬁnancial analysts were having difﬁculty in valuing e-businesses and
justifying observed stock prices. Nocera (1999) reports that Lise Buyer, a
leading Internet analyst at Credit Suisse First Boston, had simply aban-
doned traditional valuation models for Internet stocks altogether. The pur-
pose of this paper is to conduct a post-mortem review of the valuation
techniques used by analysts for Internet stocks prior to the technology
crash of 2000.
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TRADITIONAL METHOD OF STOCK EVALUATION
 
Fundamental analysis failed in the case of Internet stocks. This comes as no
surprise since the determination of stock value is generally based on dis-
counted future cash ﬂows and virtually all Internet stocks were operating at a
perpetual loss prior to 2000. Fox and Hodges (1999) emphasize how custom-
ary ﬁnancial measures were difﬁcult to interpret for Internet stocks:
 
Internet stocks aren’t like other stocks. Figuring out whether any stock is
reasonably priced is something of a crapshoot, but for most companies
there are at least some widely agreed upon yardsticks: book value, current
earnings, projected earnings growth. Internet companies have no tangible
assets, they boast little or nothing in the way of earnings, and their future
growth is impossible to predict reliably. So investors can’t use their custom-
ary yardsticks.
 
Furthermore, it was not clear when positive cash ﬂows could be
expected given that spending on development, growth, and acquisitions
continued to outpace revenue growth. Short-term survival was funded by
large cash reserves raised from lucrative IPOs (initial public offerings) and
additional stock offerings made after the share price had been driven up
by the market. Lashinsky (1999) concludes that Internet companies typi-
cally had six quarters of cash reserves at their current expense rates and
those that had carved out a niche could often raise much more. By early
2000, Amazon.com had nearly 16 quarters of cash, allowing them plenty of
time to hold on.
Valuation models based on discounted cash ﬂows (DCFs) or dividend
discount models (DDMs) had been used successfully to value securities but
were not useful for companies that were unlikely to show a proﬁt in the
foreseeable future. This certainly does not mean that Internet companies
had no economic value but rather, they had no intrinsic value as deter-
mined by traditional ﬁnancial measures. In fact, these dependable metrics
were soon deemed antiquated, as stocks severed their ties to gravity (Bri-
ody, McDonald, & Moskowitz, 2002).
Alternative pricing models included the Capital Asset Pricing Model
(CAPM) and other common yardsticks including Price/Earnings (P/E)
and PE/G (Price/Earnings/Growth) ratios (Briody et al., 2002). Internet
stocks were considered very risky ventures and often came with high
expected returns. CAPM predicted high returns for risky Internet stocks as
expected; however, this theoretical formula was not suitable for valuation
purposes. Traditional ﬁnancial measures such as earnings and dividends
were not useful for Internet stocks since they generally had neither. Given
that Internet stocks could not be compared using traditional accounting
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metrics, a new basis of benchmarking was required. The analyst commu-
nity quickly gravitated toward Web-based metrics.
 
WEB METRICS
 
Measurement of Web activity is no different than television’s use of Nielsen
ratings or radio’s use of Arbitron (Vonder Haar, 1999). Many measure-
ments have been used to demonstrate the popularity of Websites, the earli-
est of which was the hit. Web sites boasted “millions served” but it was
immediately obvious that the number of hits was a poor, and highly subjec-
tive, measure of Website value. The number of hits depended heavily on
Website design, a single page could have several hits, and the number of
hits did not discount page refreshes or a user backing up and reloading
pages that had previously been viewed. There is more than a little room for
manipulating the number of hits a single user will generate in a session.
The sophistication of Web metrics has improved signiﬁcantly since the
early days of the simplistic counting of hits. Various Web metrics have been
developed that attempt to provide more meaningful measures of Web per-
formance. These second-generation Web metrics include click-throughs,
unique visitors, reach, length of stay, registered users, and repeat visits.
The various Web metrics that have been used along with the pros and
cons of each are summarized in Table 1.1 (Vonder Haar, 1999). Currently,
 
Table 1.1. Summary of Web Metrics 
 
Web Metric Description
 
Hit One count per request for data. Highly subjective and easily manip-
ulated.
Page View One count per HTML page. A better measure of an advertising 
opportunity given that advertising banners are changed with each 
new page served.
Click-Through Tracks the number and percentage of customers that follow an 
advertising link. Sites with higher click through numbers/percent-
ages can drive higher advertising revenue. Speciﬁc to advertising 
potential.
Unique Visitors Counts unique IP addresses to determine the number of individu-
als viewing a site. A useful metric to an advertiser that wants to 
expose as many people as possible to their product. 
Reach The percentage of the Internet population visiting a particular site 
per month. Based on sample user-groups. Internet population is 
not well deﬁned or accurately known.
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companies such as MediaMetrix, Service Metrics, netScore, and Nielsen’s
NetRatings offer services to track and report Website performance statistics
that Web businesses can use to demonstrate their popularity, Internet mar-
ket share, or advertising potential to investors and advertisers.
Combinations of the above and additional metrics are currently offered
by MediaMetrix in their measurement reports
 
 
 
(see www.comscore.com).
These reports are most valuable to companies that are not able to track,
report, or benchmark the metrics themselves, or for those companies look-
ing for an impartial third-party assessment. The MediaMetrix measures
include: (1) unique visitors; (2) reach; (3) average usage days per user; (4)
average unique pages per user per day and month; (5) average minutes
spent per person per page, per day and per month; (6) age and gender
composition; and (7) demographic composition among others.
The Web metrics most relevant to a particular Website or advertiser
looking for prime Web space are those that accurately reﬂect the type of
business or message to be presented. Clearly, not all Web metrics are cre-
ated equal and many do not ﬁnd common relevance across the diverse
range of Websites analysts and investors wish to compare. Of the Web met-
rics discussed above, the number of unique visitors provides the most gen-
erally applicable and unbiased measure of Website value. It is a speciﬁc and
well-deﬁned measure, is not subject to server or Internet performance lev-
els, and is generally applicable across most Websites. Thus, unique visitors
may provide a relevant and highly valuable measurement for comparing
and valuing Internet stocks that do not lend themselves to traditional met-
rics and valuation methods. 
 
Length of Stay The average length of stay can identify sites whose users spend little 
time per page and are not likely to read ads versus those sites that 
attract users that absorb the information presented. Could be 
affected by transfer rates and overall Internet performance; slow 
transfer rates would artiﬁcially improve this metric.
Registered Users Number of users who have registered by providing name, age, and/
or other demographic data. The use of cookies and other tools can 
accurately identify the users who are visiting a site or viewing an ad. 
User-speciﬁc ads can be viewed. Provides greater user information; 
however, many users will not register.
Repeat Visits A measure of the number of times a user may view a speciﬁc adver-
tising banner.
Vonder Haar (1999)
 
Table 1.1. Summary of Web Metrics (Cont.)
 
Web Metric Description
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LITERATURE REVIEW
 
The academic literature in the Web metric ﬁeld is sparse. This is attribut-
able to the novelty of the measurement techniques that have only recently
gained widespread use and to the limited number of ﬁrms available for
study. We believe that this ﬁeld is at the embryonic stage of an exciting
research trajectory. As reported by Hand (1999), very few studies in Inter-
net stock valuation have been published in academic literature. Hand
examined the claim that larger losses in Internet stocks translated to
higher stock prices (Hand, 1999). Wysocki (1998) examined the cross-sec-
tional and time-series determinants of message-posting volume on stock
message boards on the Web. In 1999 Wysocki used pre-announcement and
announcement period message-posting activity on 
 
The Motley Fool
 
  stock
chat boards to test Kim and Verrecchia’s (1997) predictions on the relation
between trading volume during an earnings announcement and the
amount of private investor information prior to and during the earnings
announcement. 
In another study, Cooper, Dimitrov, and Rau (1999) document a strik-
ing abnormal return of 125% for the 10 days surrounding the announce-
ment by a ﬁrm that was changing its name to an Internet-related “.com”
one. Schill and Zhou (1999) compare investors’ valuations of Internet
carve-outs with those of the parent. They ﬁnd several examples of parents
whose value in holdings of carved-out Internet subsidiaries violate the law-
of-one-price by exceeding the market value of the entire parent. Such vio-
lations are large and remain over an extended period of time. Related to
the Internet subsidiary is the emergence of the “tracking stock.” Several
companies, Donaldson Lufkin & Jenrette (DLJ Direct) and Disney (Go
Network) for example, have sold the “net” part of their businesses to the
public by spinning them off into separate companies. Doing so allows these
companies to unlock the value of the underlying business and capture the
price-to-hype ratios of an Internet company without giving up control or
proﬁts (Adamson, 2000).
 
HYPOTHESIS DEVELOPMENT
 
Our research objective is to assess the importance of Web metrics in pre-
dicting Internet stock prices at a time when traditional accounting mea-
sures did not make sense. Pundits alleged that conventional accounting
data, such as earnings and book values, had little or no relevance to Inter-
net ﬁrms’ stock prices because the vast majority of Internet ﬁrms had never
reported a proﬁt prior to the technology crash of 2000. Traditional pricing
models based on accounting information, such as Ohlson’s equity valua-
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tion model, posit that a ﬁrm’s stock price is a linear function of book
equity, net income, net dividends, and other information that helps predict
future abnormal earnings but is not yet incorporated in current ﬁnancial
statements (Ohlson, 1995). As a response to the insufﬁcient explanatory
power of traditional accounting measures, several Internet analysts
resorted to Web-based metrics to help validate their predicted valuations.
To test this hypothesis, we propose that Web-based metrics did as equally
good a job in predicting Internet stock prices as compared to traditional
valuation models based on accounting information. In this context, con-
sider the following regression model:
P
 
it 
 
= 
 
β
 
0
 
 + 
 
β
 
1
 
REV
 
it 
 
+ 
 
β
 
2
 
MAR
 
it 
 
+ 
 
β
 
3
 
SLM
 
it 
 
+ 
 
β
 
4
 
UNQ
 
it
 
where P
 
it 
 
is the stock price P of ﬁrm 
 
i
 
 at time 
 
t
 
, 
 
β
 
 represents the standard-
ized coefﬁcient of each variable, REV is the ﬁrm’s revenues, MAR is the
ﬁrm’s gross margin, SLM is the ﬁrm’s selling and marketing expenses, and
UNQ is the reported number of unique visitors to the ﬁrm’s Website.
The equation above contains both traditional accounting variables (i.e.,
REV, MAR, and SLM) as well as the Web-based metric that describes the num-
ber of unique visitors (i.e., UNQ). Given that Internet market share is linked
directly to the number of distinct users that visit a Website, economic value is
thought to be created by the number of “unique users” that a Website can
attract. Based on our previous discussion, we hypothesize the following:
 
Hypothesis 1:
 
Website metrics do as good a job at explaining Internet stock prices
as traditional accounting measures do.
 
In other words, we expect the following three conditions to hold true:
I:
 
β
 
1
 
, 
 
β
 
2
 
, 
 
β
 
3
 
, and 
 
β
 
4
 
 > 0
II: the ﬁnal speciﬁed model should be robust
III:
 
β
 
4
 
 should be substantive and signiﬁcant
where:
 
β
 
1
 
 = variable coefﬁcient for REV (revenues)
 
β
 
2
 
 = variable coefﬁcient for MAR (gross margin)
 
β
 
3
 
 = variable coefﬁcient for SLM (sales and marketing expenses)
 
β
 
4
 
 = variable coefﬁcient for UNQ (unique visitors)
 
IA183-Johnson.book  Page 8  Thursday, April 1, 2004  4:27 PM 
Dot-Bomb Post-Mortem 9
 
DATA COLLECTION
 
To test the aforementioned hypothesis, we collected data for 15 of the top
Internet ﬁrms that were publicly trading by the last quarter in 1999 prior to
the technology crash in early 2000. We coded monthly stock price, ﬁnan-
cial statement, and unique visitor data. Although there were over 250 net
stocks listed by September 1999, a signiﬁcant proportion of these had gone
public within the last couple of quarters, leaving only a handful that were
publicly trading at the beginning of calendar 1999. This issue limited the
size of our sample signiﬁcantly. 
Two separate sources of data were combined in order to complete the
overall sample of 10 periods of data for each of 15 ﬁrms. The ﬁnancial state-
ment data was collected by Credit Suisse First Boston and this was combined
with the Web-based unique visitor data that was collected by MediaMetrix.
Both of these sources followed the ISDEX Internet Stock Index (see
www.InternetNews.com), which represented the most comprehensive listing
of Internet companies at the time. Hand (1999) reports that ISDEX is one of
the most widely recognized Internet indices reported by such media centers
as 
 
The Wall Street Journal
 
, 
 
Reuters
 
, 
 
Dow Jones Newswire
 
, and 
 
CNBC
 
. ISDEX repre-
sents over 90% of the capitalization of the Internet stock universe on an ongo-
ing basis. Companies in the e-commerce sector must attract at least 51% of
their revenues from the Internet to qualify for listing.
 
DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS
 
Table 1.2 provides selected information for the sample of 15 companies on
a ﬁrm-by-ﬁrm basis. The 15 companies are sorted based on the number of
unique users reported on September 17, 1999 for the end of the previous
month. For example, Yahoo (YHOO) had the largest user base in our sam-
ple with over 40 million unique users as compared to Cyberian Outpost
(COOL) with approximately 331,000 unique customers. The greatest
change in user base from our earliest report date of October, 29 1998, was
Beyond.com (BYND), which increased the number of its unique customers
by a remarkable 387%. 
Table 1.2 also shows the closing stock price and market capitalization for
each stock. The accompanying change values measure the difference as
reported from October 29, 1988, to September 17, 1999. The largest gain
in stock price was by eBay (EBAY) with an astounding 430%. Financial
accounting data is represented by revenue, gross margin, and sales and
marketing expenses. These ﬁgures are annualized based on the previous
quarter in millions of dollars. The most signiﬁcant growth for each of these
values was by At Home (ATHM) with a spectacular 3,940% increase in
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gross margin. (Please refer to the Appendix for a more detailed descrip-
tion of each company in this study.)
Table 1.3 summarizes descriptive statistics in addition to highlighting
the correlation matrix of the key variables. Two key features stand out in
Table 1.3. First, there is almost perfect correlation among the three
accounting measures REV (revenues), MAR (gross margin), and SLM
(sales and marketing expenses). Second, UNQ (unique users) has the
highest correlation (
 
r
 
 = 0.469) with PRICE (stock price). We decided to use
the four aforementioned measures in this study for the following reasons:
• revenues are generally synonymous with the size of companies and 
are often used as measures of comparison from one organization to 
the next;
• gross margin is more important in the context of Internet stocks 
because of lack of proﬁtability;
• sales and marketing expenses are leading indicators for the amount 
of investment net stocks are throwing into attracting new customers 
via online advertising; and
• unique visitors is a close proxy for the number of unique online cus-
tomers a particular company has attracted.
Measuring revenue and gross margin is an obvious approach for track-
ing stock prices taught in most fundamental securities courses. Himelstein
(1999) describes why sales and marketing expenses should also be followed
in the case of Internet stocks:
 
Table 1.3. Descriptive Statistics
 
Descriptive Statistics Pearson Correlation Matrix
Mean Std. Deviation Price REV Mar SLM UNQ
 
PRICE 48.4 38.6 1.000
REV 479.8 1,068.8 0.016 1.000
MAR 198.6 452.7 0.097 0.980 1.000
SLM 102.3 160.8 0.102 0.969 0.966 1.000
UNQ 7735.2 10,111.0 0.469 0.259 0.337 0.370 1.000
 
Note:
 
 PRICE (the monthly stock price adjusted for splits and dividends as reported on the 
day of CSFB’s Internet Valuation Update), REV (annualized revenues of previous quarter in 
millions of dollars), MAR (annualized gross margin of previous quarter in millions of dol-
lars), SLM (annualized sales and marketing expenses of previous quarter in millions of dol-
lars), and UNQ (number of unique visitors in previous month in thousands).
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For ﬁve quarters running, CNET Inc. has done what few Internet companies
have done: shown a proﬁt. But now Chairman and Chief Executive Halsey M.
Minor is chucking his conservative, money-making approach. On June 30,
Minor announced that he will plunge into the red with a $100 million ad
campaign aimed at making CNET’s name as synonymous with technology as
ESPN is with sports. Says Minor: “This is a bold play for a dominant position.
In putting growth ahead of proﬁt, Minor hopes to emulate the success of
other Web companies such as Amazon.com Inc. The online retailer is one of
the top companies in cyberspace and the darling of investors—even though
it won’t make a dime until 2001 at the earliest.”
 
Sparks (1999) makes the same case for the importance of sales and mar-
keting expenses:
 
While hundreds of Internet companies are using a variety of ploys to become
the market leader, heavy spending on marketing seems to be the real key to
achieving dominance.
 
It is important to emphasize that many other accounting and Web-based
measures could have been selected but leading Internet analysts Lise Buyer
at CSFB and Steve Harmon at Steve-Harmon.com both afﬁrm (in personal
interviews) that these are the most closely watched by the investment com-
munity. Nocera (1999) points out that Steve Harmon is committed to using
Web-based metrics:
 
Steve Harmon never had to capitulate on valuations. That’s because he had
decided from the very beginning that using the valuation “metrics” of the
past for Internet stocks made no sense. So he decided to invent some metrics
that he could apply to Internet companies.
 
One ﬁnal, important note worth highlighting is that the 15 Internet
companies were clustered into three categories, which is illustrated in
Table 1.2. This was required in order to make logical comparisons of the
UNQ variable. The ﬁrst category includes Internet companies with 
 
unique
users
 
 such as Yahoo and Lycos. These sites are so-called Web portals and act
as launching pads for online activity that include functionality such as per-
sonalized Web pages and search engines. Most of the revenue generation
at these sites comes from advertising dollars.
The second category includes Internet companies with 
 
unique customers
 
such as Amazon.com and eBay. These e-commerce sites attract actual
credit-card yielding customers who are willing to purchase or auction prod-
ucts over the Web. A signiﬁcant amount of the revenue generated at these
sites comes directly from the consumer, as is the case with Amazon.com, or
as a service fee, as is the case with eBay.
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Finally, the third cluster of companies represents online Internet service
providers such as American Online and Earthlink who attract 
 
unique sub-
scribers
 
. This set of companies brings the consumer to the Internet by pro-
viding the consumer with home access to the Web. These companies
receive actual monthly payments in the form of subscription fees.
Since the UNQ ﬁgure has slightly different deﬁnitions across these
three segments of net stocks, we felt that it was important to control for this
subtle but importance difference in our research methodology.
 
RESULTS
 
Triple-digit growth ﬁgures are commonplace for this sample of companies,
as illustrated in Table 1.2. Therein lies the problem. The spectacular
growth of these companies over the relative short period of time they were
studied should be considered a blip in the normal rise of the equity mar-
kets. In fact, it is this meteoric phenomenon that leads us to reexamining
how we are valuing stock price ﬂuctuations for this speciﬁc sector.
Table 1.4 highlights the regression results of our study. First, the Base
Model considers the two control variables only. C1 and C2 represent the
two dummy variables that account for the three clusters of companies. The
base model has a relatively low explanatory power (
 
R
 
2
 
 = 3.6%) and is insig-
niﬁcant (
 
F
 
 = 2.755, 
 
p
 
 > 0.05).
Model 1 builds on the previous model by simultaneously inserting all three
of the traditional accounting measures: REV (revenues), MAR (gross mar-
gin), and SLM (sales and marketing). Although the explanatory power (
 
R
 
2
 
 =
22.8%) and signiﬁcance (
 
F = 8.502, p < 0.001) were improved over the base
model, this model has two fatal ﬂaws. First, the beta coefﬁcient for REV is neg-
ative (β1 = –2.669, p < 0.001). Second, the VIF (variance inﬂation factor) val-
ues for each of these three variables is signiﬁcantly greater than 10 (REV =
40.7, MAR = 39.5, SLM = 20.6). The regression results of Model 1 show that
there is an inverse relationship between revenues and stock price. This is
counterintuitive to the general pattern we see in equity markets where over
the long-term both revenues and stock prices rise together. The results here
call into question the fundamental relationships we have come to expect with
stocks. In this particular sample of 15 Internet companies over the period we
studied, there was an unexpected relationship between revenues and stock
price. The second ﬂaw of this model is that the high VIF values conﬁrm a
multicollinearity problem that exists among the variables. This was expected
based on the high correlations of each variable found in Table 1.3 and may
explain the unorthodox direction of the REV coefﬁcient. Perhaps this prob-
lem can be mitigated by inserting only one ﬁnancial indicator at a time cou-
pled with the UNQ variable. The next three models test exactly that. 
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Models 2 through 4 examine the relationship of both traditional and Web-
based measures by inserting one ﬁnancial measure together with the UNQ
variable. In Model 2 we inserted the REV and UNQ variables simultaneously
to the base model. The explanatory power (R2 = 29.8%) and signiﬁcance (F =
15.413, p < 0.001) of this model are relatively strong for predicting stock
price. Since only one ﬁnancial variable is used in this model, there is no mul-
ticollinearity, which is conﬁrmed with adequate VIF values for all variables.
Also, the introduction of the UNQ variable (β4 = 0.806, p < 0.001) shows a
positive and signiﬁcant relationship with stock price. However, the interesting
observation in this model is that the REV coefﬁcient (β1 = –0.304, p < 0.001) is
signiﬁcant but negative. As explained earlier, this result is not expected and is
highly suspect.
It seems that for the period of this study and among these 15 compa-
nies, the Web-based variable UNQ was a positive and signiﬁcant predictor
of stock price, whereas REV acted in an inverse relationship with stock
price. The same phenomenon is present in Models 3 and 4. Model 3 shows
the MAR variable with a negative coefﬁcient (β2 = –0.232, p < 0.05) and
Model 4 shows the SLM variable with a negative coefﬁcient (β3 = –0.263, p
< 0.01), even though UNQ is positive and signiﬁcant in all models.
In the case of Models 2, 3, and 4, we ﬁnd the Web-based variable (UNQ)
is positively associated with stock price. This makes intuitive sense since as
the number of unique visitors for each Internet ﬁrm ﬂuctuated widely
from month to month during this period, so did stock prices. Interestingly,
the accounting measures (REV, MAR, and SLM) were not positively associ-
ated with stock price. It seems that stock price ﬂuctuations were inversely
related to the ﬁnancial growth of these companies. These results lend cre-
dence to the heated commentary in the public press surrounding the illog-
ical valuations of Internet ﬁrms and further supports Hand’s (1999)
contention that larger losses in Web-based companies are associated with
higher stock prices. We decided to test Model 5 to determine whether or
not a solely Web-based model was valid.
In Model 5 we inserted the UNQ variable to the base model without any
traditional ﬁnancial measures. The explanatory power (R2 = 24.5%) and
signiﬁcance (F = 15.768, p < 0.001) of this model was on par with the oth-
ers. In fact, the F-stat of this model is the highest of all. As predicted, the
UNQ standardized coefﬁcient (β4 = 0.607, p < 0.001) is still positive, sub-
stantive, and signiﬁcant.
Table 1.5 depicts an evaluation of each model based on the three condi-
tions we speciﬁed earlier. First, we were hoping to ﬁnd positive β coefﬁ-
cients for each variable as hypothesized. Every model except Model 5 had
at least one variable that was not in the anticipated direction. Second, we
were hoping to validate a robust model without any multicollinearity prob-
lems. Model 2 suffered from this due to the high correlations among the
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ﬁnancial accounting variables (REV, MAR, and SLM). Finally, our third
condition was to ﬁnd a model that speciﬁed a positive, substantive, and sig-
niﬁcant β coefﬁcient for the UNQ variable. 
Model 5 is the only model that meets all three conditions while still
remaining relatively strong in its explanatory power and overall signiﬁ-
cance. Based on these results we support the following hypothesis:
H1Website metrics do as equally good a job at explaining Internet stock 
prices as traditional accounting measures do.
DISCUSSION
As with any study, there are limitations to this research. The small sample
of 15 companies and only 10 data periods spanning one year limits the
generalizability of the analysis. However, the Internet stock phenomenon
was relatively new and little data was available, particularly in the area of
Web metrics. In fact, during the period of this study many Internet stocks
had only been trading for a few months and, thus, could not be included.
A few months later in 2000, the technology crash rendered the stock price
data invalid so the window of opportunity for studying this phenomenon
was quite tight.
A second limitation to the analysis is the deﬁnition of gross margin used
among public companies. The determination and accounting calculation
of gross margin varies from company to company and is not expected to be
precisely consistent among the included set. However, considering that
gross margin was almost perfectly correlated with revenue (r = 0.98, Table
1.3), which is more consistently deﬁned among companies, we can draw
conclusions from the statistical testing of REV. We do not discount the lim-
itation of the highly intercorrelated relationship but rather have sought to
minimize the limitation through testing each of REV, MAR, and SLM inde-
pendently of one another.
Table 1.5. Model Results
Conditions Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5
I xxxx√
II x √ √ √ √
III 8 8 8 8 √
Note: Conditions I: β1, β2, β3, and β4 > 0
II: the ﬁnal speciﬁed model should be robust
III: β4 should be substantive and signiﬁcant
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SPRING 2000 NASDAQ CRASH
Prior to and during the period of study, Internet stocks had generally
shown very strong growth with the NASDAQ reaching an all-time high of
over 5,100 points in March 2000, but fell nearly 35% by the end of April.
Although speciﬁc conclusions cannot be drawn regarding the nature of the
decline with respect to the valuation of Internet stocks, this event supports
the idea that without a strong fundamental basis for stock prices, extreme
volatility can be expected. 
With the results of this study showing a strong relationship between the
number of unique users and the valuation of Internet stocks without the
consideration for traditional accounting measures, the writing for a poten-
tial crash may have been on the wall. While the use of Web metrics may not
have served as an entirely accurate valuation methodology, it is our belief
that analysts abused their usage when traditional proﬁts were nowhere to
be found. In sum, analysts resorted to using Web metrics as a proxy for val-
uation even though those measures had no fundamental connection to
market capitalization.
IMPLICATIONS AND FUTURE DIRECTIONS
Analysts and investors alike are drowning in information overload. Individ-
uals who study stocks from home have access to enormous amounts of
ﬁnancial facts and ﬁgures never before available to day-trading amateurs.
All of this was taking place in a jungle-like virtual environment in which
investors hungered for a little piece of the action. Of course, the bubble
inevitably burst and trading volumes have since dropped signiﬁcantly.
The results of this study highlight the abuse of Web-based metrics for
valuation purposes by the analyst community at a time when traditional
accounting measures did not have much explanatory power. We showed
that stock price movement during that particular period was explained by
Web metrics without much consideration for accounting measures. This
revelation provides insight into the mindset of many investors and technol-
ogy analysts during that period. For that period, analysts neglected the
foundations of business (i.e., revenue and proﬁt) in order to feed inves-
tors’ greedy desires for capital accumulation with an alternative explana-
tion (i.e., unique visitors).
Although the popularity of the original B2C (business-to-consumer) e-
commerce model that spawned the dot-com revolution has been replaced
with alternative forms, this research can be further advanced in the follow-
ing ways. First, as time continues we will have access to more data both in
terms of the number of companies worth studying (i.e., those who have
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both thrived and died) and in terms of the length of period for which we
can accumulate data. Second, we may consider hybrid measures that com-
bine both ﬁnancial and Web-based metrics such as (1) gross margin per
user, or (2) sales and marketing expense per subscriber revenue. In both
cases, researchers, analysts, and the technology ﬁrms themselves will be
able to determine cost–beneﬁt analyses using these measures. For exam-
ple, using the second measure we can answer the following question: Are
we spending too much money to attract new customers?
Academic researchers will also beneﬁt from Web-based metric develop-
ment innovations that will create new measures for analysis. For example,
we could measure the click-through rates of certain banner ads and deter-
mine the ability for that online advertising to generate new customers.
Alternatively, we could measure the amount of time each unique visitor
spends in security-cache mode. Security-cache mode in a Web browser is
automatically turned on when a consumer is about to make a credit-card
purchase. This would help us consider the following situation in determin-
ing which Internet company is better to invest in: 
Internet company A had an overall average online time of 4 hours for every
unique customer during month X. Each customer spent 15 minutes of that
time in security-cache mode. Internet company B had an overall online time of
2 hours for every unique customer with 30 minutes in security-cache mode.
Based on the previous scenario, is it better that more value-added time is
spent actually purchasing (company B) or that customers spend more time
looking for items to purchase (company A)? The answer is not that obvious
because although company B may be in the best situation today, company
A may provide the greater long-term revenue potential because of the
larger product/service selection. There are also tangential implications for
security design and navigation when such measures are available for study.
Another possible advantage of Web-based metrics in complementing
traditional accounting metrics is the potential for daily reporting. Web-
based metrics can be collected in real-time and be made available to man-
agement and the public at much shorter intervals for analysis. Investors will
have the latest information on Web-based metrics and will not have to wait
for quarterly reports or audited statements. In the future, it is probable
that Internet companies will be required to disclose standard Web-based
metrics in quarterly and annual reports along with other measures of
ﬁnancial performance.
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CONCLUSION
Internet business models are in a state of ﬂux as this industry continues to
suffer from growing pains. What we do know is that early on in the dot-com
boom, ﬁnancial indicators were replaced with Web measures forcing share-
holders to adopt untested methodologies for valuation.
The rise in Internet stocks (and especially B2C dot-coms) was akin to
the California Gold Rush of 150 years ago. Day-traders were picking up
net stocks quicker than prospectors bought barren mountainside. Yester-
day’s IPO celebrations have been compared to miners striking gold. In the
dot-com market, investors were playing a game of Russian roulette by bet-
ting on potential winners. The feeding frenzy attracted all sorts of sharks.
No one truly knew when or if the Internet bubble would burst. However,
like geologists arguing over the best way to prospect for gold, analysts
argued for a better way to ﬁnd leading indicators for Internet stock price
valuation.
The negative coefﬁcients for the traditional metrics (revenue, gross
margin, and sales and marketing expenses) show that—during the period
of this study—the market very likely ignored the traditional ﬁnancial indi-
cators available for the companies included in the analysis. Furthermore,
it is unclear whether the market directly considered the increases in
unique visitors as a performance indicator or that the share price and the
number of unique visitors both increased with the “hype” of a particular
company as opposed to any ﬁnancial fundamentals. In retrospect, this dis-
tinction is not as important as the fact that the predictive power of the
Web-based metric appears to be positive, substantive, and signiﬁcant dur-
ing this time period.
Nevertheless, with full hindsight after this post-mortem analysis, we
resort to suggesting that investing in Internet stocks was similar to gam-
bling in a casino. Graham and Dodd (1951) originally said it best way back
in 1934:
Unseasoned companies in new ﬁelds of activity provide no sound basis for
the determination of intrinsic value. The risks inherent in the business, and
uncertain management, and uncertain access to traditional capital combine
to make an analytical determination of value unlikely if not impossible. Ana-
lysts serve their discipline best by identifying such companies as highly specu-
lative and by not attempting to value them, even though we recognize there
will be pressure to make valuations of initial public offering and other unsea-
soned issues. The buyer of such securities is not making an investment, but a
bet, on a new technology, a new market, a new service, or a new innovation in
an established business market. Winning in such situations can produce very
rich rewards, but they are in an odd setting, rather than a valuation process.
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APPENDIX:
COMPANY DESCRIPTIONS
Yahoo! Inc. 1999 Sales
$588.6M USD
Drawing nearly 31 million visitors to its Website 
each month, Yahoo! can lay claim to the top spot 
among Internet portals. The company also boasts 
about 3,800 advertisers (banner ads bring in the 
bulk of Yahoo!'s revenue) and stands apart as one 
of the few Internet players operating in the black. 
Its Website features items such as e-mail, chat 
rooms, news, and stock quotes. Top Competitors: 
Lycos, Inc., Excite, Inc., America Online, Inc. 
www.yahoo.com Employees: 803
Nasdaq YHOO CEO: Timothy 
Koogle
Fiscal Year Ends 
Dec. 31
CFO: Gary Valen-
zuela
Lycos, Inc. 1999 Sales
$166.8M USD
Lycos is one of the fastest-growing net companies 
and remains an independent player among many 
Internet company consolidations. The Lycos Net-
work offers Web searching, chat rooms, e-mail, 
news, and free personal home pages. Nearly 75% 
of Lycos' revenue is from advertising with the 
remainder from e-commerce agreements and 
licensing agreements with partners such as Bertels-
mann and Microsoft. CMGI, an Internet invest-
ment ﬁrm, owns 20% of Lycos. Top Competitors: 
Yahoo! Inc., Infoseek Corporation, Excite, Inc.
www.lycos.com Employees: 785
Nasdaq / LCOS CEO: Robert J. 
Davis
Fiscal Year Ends 
July 31
CFO: Edward M. 
Philip
Infoseek
Corporation
Bought by
Go Network
1999 Sales
$217.2M USD
Through partnering with Walt Disney Company, 
Infoseek has evolved from a simple search engine 
to the operator of the GO Network, an Internet 
gateway combining Infoseek’s search and direc-
tory services with Disney-related Websites such as 
ABCNEWS.com, Disney.com, ESPN.com, and 
Family.com. Almost 90% of the company’s reve-
nue comes from advertising, much of the remain-
der from technology licensing. Disney owns 43% 
of the company. Top Competitors: Yahoo! Inc., 
Lycos, Inc., America Online, Inc. 
infoseek.go.com Employees: 319
Nasdaq / GO CEO: Steven Born-
stein
Fiscal Year Ends 
Sep. 30
CFO: Spencer 
Neumann
CNET, Inc. 1999 Sales
$112.3M USD
CNET is primarily an information portal for high-
tech industries including computers, the Internet, 
and digital technologies. CNET operates several 
Websites including cnet.com, shareware.com, 
search.com, snap.com, and news.com. It also pro-
duces Internet-related television programs, which 
are carried on the USA Network and the Sci-Fi 
Channel. CNET receives over 3/4 of its revenue 
from Internet advertising. Top Competitors: 
ZDNet Group, Wired Digital, Inc., International 
Data Group
www.cnet.com Employees:
Nasdaq / CNET CEO: Halsey M. 
Minor
Fiscal Year Ends 
Dec. 31
CFO: Douglas N. 
Woodrum
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SportsLine USA, 
Inc.
1999 Sales
$60.3M USD
SportsLine USA operates cbs.sportsline.com pro-
viding real-time sports news. It covers sporting 
events, teams, and players including photos, 
audio, video clips, and Internet broadcast pro-
grams. Other SportsLine Websites provide infor-
mation on sports superstars as well as information 
on major sporting events and gambling odds 
through vegasinsider.com. Advertising represents 
more than half of SportsLine's revenue while sub-
scriptions, content licensing, and sports merchan-
dise account for the remainder. CBS, which owns 
about 21% of the company, provides SportsLine 
with free advertising during TV sports broadcasts. 
Top Competitors: Walt Disney Company, Time 
Warner Inc., America Online, Inc.
www.cbs.sports-
line.com
Employees: 400
Nasdaq / SPLN CEO: Michael 
Levy
Fiscal Year Ends 
Dec. 31
CFO: Kenneth W. 
Sanders
eBay, Inc. 1999 Sales
$224.7M USD
eBay is a personal Internet auction site on which 
sellers pay to have their items listed. Potential buy-
ers browse and make bids on merchandise and 
eBay generates revenue by charging the seller a 
percentage of the closing price. The company has 
agreed to acquire Butterﬁeld & Butterﬁeld, the 
#3 auction house in the U.S. Top Competitors: 
ONSALE, Inc., uBid, Inc., Amazon.com, Inc.
www.ebay.com Employees: 138
Nasdaq / EBAY CEO: Margaret C. 
Whitman
Fiscal Year Ends 
Dec. 31
CFO: Gary F. 
Bengier
Amazon.com, Inc. 1999 Sales
$1,640M USD
Amazon.com's Website offers books, CDs, videos, 
and gifts. It also competes with eBay by conduct-
ing auctions for a wide range of items. Aggressive 
expansion is driving growth and it has a stake in 
companies offering pet supplies, prescription 
drugs, and groceries. Amazon.com has recently 
announced plans to expand further, causing ana-
lysts to question their lack of operating proﬁt. 
Amazon.com has put market share ahead of prof-
its and continues to make acquisitions funded by 
their huge market capitalization. Top Competi-
tors: eBay Inc., CDnow, Inc., Barnes & Noble, Inc.
www.amazon.com Employees: 2,100
Nasdaq / AMZN CEO: Jeffrey P. 
Bezos
Fiscal Year Ends 
Dec. 31
CFO: Warren Jen-
son
Beyond.com 1999 Sales
$117.3M USD
Beyond.com (formerly software.net) is an online 
software retailer. It maintains an inventory of 
40,000 units for direct shipment to customers. 
Relationships with about 350 software vendors 
provide an inventory of about 5,500 software titles 
that can be downloaded over the Internet. The 
company has marketing alliances with America 
Online, Excite, and Netscape. Chairman William 
McKiernan owns about 34% of the company. Top 
Competitors: Egghead.com, Inc., Digital River, 
Inc., CNET, Inc.
www.beyond.com Employees: 137
Nasdaq / BYND CEO: Rick Neely
Fiscal Year Ends 
Dec. 31
CFO: Rick Neely
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Cyberian Outpost, 
Inc.
1999 Sales
$145.6M USD
Cyberian Outpost uses the Internet to sell brand 
name computer hardware, software, and periph-
erals to consumers. The site offers more than 
130,000 items and obtains its products directly 
from manufacturers, distributors, and software 
publishers. Almost half of Cyberian's sales come 
from international customers; thus, it has trans-
lated its Website into 12 foreign languages and 
offers online currency-conversion information. 
Top Competitors: Ziff-Davis Inc., Egghead.com, 
Inc., Beyond.com
www.outpost.com Employees: 156
Nasdaq / COOL CEO: Darryl Peck
CFO: Katherine N. 
Vick
ONSALE, Inc.
Prior to Egghead 
Merger
1998 Sales
$207.8M USD
ONSALE operates Web auctions selling items 
such as computers and related products, con-
sumer electronics, sports equipment, and time-
share condominiums. ONSALE has more than 
650,000 registered bidders with 75% of sales from 
repeat customers. Major shareholders include VP 
and chief technology ofﬁcer Alan Fisher (32%) 
and CEO Jerry Kaplan (28%). Top Competitors: 
Micro Warehouse, Inc., uBid, Inc., eBay Inc.
www.onsale.com Employees: 200
Nasdaq / ONSL CEO: S. Jerrold 
Kaplan
Fiscal Year Ends 
Dec. 31
CFO: John Labbett
Egghead.com, Inc.
Prior to OnSale 
Merger
1998 Sales
$148.7M USD
Egghead.com has closed all of its brick-and-mor-
tar stores and become an Internet-only reseller of 
PC hardware, software, and accessories. Its Web-
site offers about 40,000 products as well as excess, 
reconditioned, and closeout brand-name com-
puter products. A 24-hour hardware and software 
auction site offers an alternative for bargain 
hunters. The focus is on PC products with con-
sumer electronics rounding out the product 
offering. Top Competitors: Cyberian Outpost, 
Inc., CompUSA Inc., Beyond.com 
www.eghead.com Employees: 337
Nasdaq / EGGS CEO: George P. 
Orban
Fiscal Year Ends 
Dec. 31
CFO: Brian B. 
Bender
At Home
Corporation
1999 Sales
$227.4M USD
At Home uses cable TV systems to provide high-
speed Internet access to consumers (@Home) 
and businesses (@Work). Access is about a hun-
dred times faster than traditional telephone 
modems but comes at a price premium. At Home 
partners with cable operators to market and pro-
vide its services and currently has about 500,000 
customers in the U.S. and Canada. AT&T Broad-
band and Internet Services has 40% ownership as 
well as other investors Cablevision, Comcast, and 
Cox. Top Competitors: Microsoft Corporation, US 
WEST, Inc., Time Warner Inc.
www.home.net Employees: 570
Nasdaq / ATHM CEO: George Bell
Fiscal Year Ends 
Dec. 31
CFO: Kenneth A. 
Goldman
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MindSpring Enter-
pises, Inc.
1999 Sales
$275.0M USD
MindSpring Enterprises has more than one million 
subscribers throughout the U.S. and competes with 
EarthLink for the #4 spot behind American 
Online, the Microsoft Network, and AT&T World-
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scribers and integrated the Netscape portal into 
its offering. Top Competitors: Yahoo! Inc., AT&T 
Corp., Microsoft Corporation
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June 30
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$435.0M USD
Earthlink Network, an ISP, has more than one mil-
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Network, and AT&T WorldNet). Sprint, owning 
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Sprint Internet. The company's software package, 
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MindSpring Enterprises, Inc. and EarthLink Network, Inc. merged on February 4, 2000. 
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